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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-2120 
___________ 
 
LUIS ANDRES COELLO-UDIEL, 
 Petitioner 
 v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A043-172-142) 
Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 8, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed February 5, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Luis Andres Coello–Udiel petitions for review of the decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), 
but because Coello–Udiel is subject to removal based on an aggravated felony 
conviction, that jurisdiction is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 
which we review de novo, and does not extend to factual or discretionary 
determinations.  Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(D).1  Although we review the 
BIA’s decision, we also consider the IJ’s opinion where the BIA “has substantially 
relied on that opinion.”  Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009). 
II. Discussion 
 Coello–Udiel argues that he was denied due process in his removal proceedings.   
In particular, he objects that the merits hearing was “incredibly short and fast,” Pet. Br. 
                                              
1 In this regard, the Government has moved to dismiss Coello–Udiel’s petition for 
review for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that he has failed to raise a colorable 
constitutional or legal claim.  While we conclude for the reasons below that Coello–
Udiel’s claim ultimately fails on the merits, we do not consider it to be “immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or otherwise “wholly insubstantial 
and frivolous.”  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006)). 
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at 14, and asserts that the IJ did not give him an opportunity to address the IJ’s concerns 
before denying relief.  The IJ erred, he contends, by “not asking more questions when 
[he] had concerns, providing [Coello–Udiel] the opportunity to further develop and 
clarify the [IJ’s] confusion regarding why [his supporting] facts are not speculative.”  
Pet. Br. at 18. 
Aliens facing removal are entitled to due process, Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 
671–72 (3d Cir. 1990), meaning “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful manner,” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotation 
marks, alterations, and citation omitted).  To ensure due process in removal proceedings, 
“[a]n alien: (1) is entitled to factfinding based on a record produced before the 
decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to make arguments on 
his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an individualized determination of his or 
her interests.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks, 
alterations, and citations omitted).  And to prove a denial of due process on the ground 
that he was prevented from presenting his case to the IJ or BIA, the alien must show: 
“(1) that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his case and (2) that substantial 
prejudice resulted.”  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 Here, the record does not support Coello–Udiel’s claim that he was prevented 
from reasonably presenting his case.  Coello–Udiel not only had the opportunity to argue 
before the IJ and BIA through counsel but also presented testimony and documentary 
evidence, including news articles and country condition reports.  Following the hearing, 
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the IJ discussed that testimony and evidence—observing that Coello–Udiel was a 
credible witness, that he feared being tortured and killed by MS-13, and that he had 
twice been threatened by gang members in the United States—but the IJ ultimately 
concluded that Coello-Udiel’s fear of torture with the consent or acquiescence of 
Honduran officials was merely speculative.   
Nor does the record support Coello-Udiel’s assertion that the IJ failed to ask 
follow-up questions.  Following Coello–Udiel’s testimony and counsel’s argument, the 
IJ specifically asked counsel for additional case law supporting the notion that the 
Honduran government acquiesces in torture, but counsel was unable to cite to such case 
law.  While it is true that the IJ did not recess the proceedings for counsel to conduct 
further research, due process does not require an IJ, after the conclusion of a merits 
hearing, to provide counsel with additional time to search for cases or gather unspecified 
evidence.  See Morgan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that 
IJ did not deny alien due process by denying motions to continue).   
In any event, even assuming some error by the IJ or BIA in the extent of evidence 
or argument permitted, Coello–Udiel has failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice, as 
he does not identify what evidence he would have provided or what arguments he would 
have made.  See id. at 235.  Instead, he merely rehashes the evidence he presented to the 
IJ and argues that it was indeed sufficient to demonstrate that the risk of torture with the 
acquiescence of Honduran officials was more than speculative.  Such sufficiency-of-the-
evidence arguments, however, are beyond our purview.  See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515. 
 Finally, Coello–Udiel argues that the IJ and BIA, as a common-sense matter, 
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should have taken judicial notice that he would inevitably be targeted by MS-13 
members upon return to Honduras.  He asserts as “commonly acceptable [sic] 
circumstances” that corruption is rampant in Honduras, that MS-13 operates with 
impunity there, and that, due to the “street code” under which the gang operates, Coello–
Udiel would nearly certainly be labeled a “snitch” and would be murdered.  Pet. Br. at 
13, 20.  To the extent these arguments challenge the determination that he was not likely 
to be tortured in Honduras with the acquiescence of government officials, they challenge 
a factual finding over which we lack jurisdiction.  See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515.  And 
taking the IJ’s factual findings as true, the IJ and BIA did not commit legal error by 
denying Coello-Udiel’s application on the basis that he was not likely to be tortured in 
Honduras with the acquiescence of the Honduran government.  See Kamara v. Att’y 
Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005).   
III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Respondent’s motion to dismiss and 
Coello–Udiel’s petition for review. 
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